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Federal government arts programs appear to deviate from the rule that legislative 
behavior closely follows public preferences.  Since the early 1970s, public opinion 
surveys have found stable if modest majorities supporting federal aid to the arts.  Yet 
during that period the National Endowment for the Arts, the agency responsible for 
federal arts support, has faced volatile legislative treatment: great favor until 1978, 
budgetary stagnation through the Carter and Reagan administrations, and congressional 
disfavor, culminating in sharp budget cuts and agency reorganization, after 1989.  We 
inspect 55 items from public opinion surveys and re-analyze data from 2 state and 8 
national surveys undertaken between 1975 and 1996 to resolve this puzzle.  Our 
conclusions: (1) Arts support is not a salient issue to most voters, leaving legislators 
relatively unconstrained.  (2) Positive responses to general questions about arts funding 
often mask complex, ambivalent views.  (3) The core constituency for federal arts 
support – college graduates – is difficult to mobilize because their interest in the arts is 
balanced by skepticism about federal government programs.  (4) Opponents of arts 
spending successfully built on ties to Christian conservative and Republican loyalists to 
mobilize the stable minorities opposed to the NEA.  As a result, arts politics in the U.S. 
has consisted of a standoff between a committed minority of 15 to 20 percent of the 
public that strongly opposes federal support for the arts and a weakly committed majority 
of about 60 percent that favors the federal role. DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---3---  
Introduction 
 
Americans love the arts: majorities of close to 90 percent routinely agree that the arts are 
vital to the good life, that they are important to the development of children and that they 
enhance the quality of communities (Pettit and DiMaggio 1998).  What is more, stable if 
modest majorities have endorsed government support for the arts for the past three 
decades.    
Many political scientists and political sociologists have argued persuasively that 
legislative action tends to reflect the views of the constituents that congresspersons are 
elected to represent, and that changes in policy tend to reflect trends in public opinion 
(Page and Shapiro 1992; Burstein 1998).  If so, the rocky career of the National Endow-
ment for the Arts (NEA), the federal agency with the primary responsibility for finan-
cially assisting arts organizations, would appear to pose an exception, for its legislative 
fortunes have been volatile despite stable and generally positive public attitudes towards 
arts funding.  “The National Endowment for the Arts has been described as `embattled’ 
for so long,” writes one observer, “that it now probably assumes that word is part of its 
name” (Brenson 1998: 25).    
Between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, despite stability in public opinion, the 
NEA evolved from Congress’s bipartisan darling to its controversial scapegoat.  The 
agency’s appropriations, which spiraled upward 1970 to 1979, stagnated for sixteen years 
until they were cut sharply in FY96 (National Endowment for the Arts 1998).  Recently, 
Congress has been divided: in 1997, the House of Representatives voted to abolish the 
agency at the same time that the Republican chair of the Senate Labor and Human Re-DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---4---  
sources Committee introduced bipartisan legislation to almost double its appropriation.  
In 1998, once again many Representatives voted to kill the NEA (the House Interior 
Subcommittee came within a single vote of recommending its elimination), while 
Senators with whom they shared their constituencies voted to increase its appropriations.  
(In the end the Agency’s budget was unchanged.) 
Figure 1 documents an evident disjuncture between public opinion and legislative 
action towards the NEA.   Whereas the NEA budget began a long decline (in real dollars) 
in 1980, public support for federal arts funding actually increased between 1980 and 
1992, only declining slightly in 1996 (National Research Center for the Arts 1980, 1984, 
1987, 1992; Americans for the Arts 1996).   Throughout this period a majority of survey 
respondents said they would pay an extra $10 in taxes so that the federal government 
could spend more on the arts, with the percentage peaking in 1987.  
  To be sure, the NEA’s changing fortunes demand a multicausal explanation (Wys-
zomirski 1994).  The agency rose on the tide of a Great Society consensus that boosted 
federal spending in many areas.  Its decline was part of a conservative resurgence that 
called into question most kinds of federal spending.  The NEA’s misfortunes reflected, as 
well, both heightened partisan conflict and a division within the Republican Party be-
tween economic conservatives and social conservatives supported by the religious right.  
Nonetheless, the agency’s oscillations of  fortune --- both its rise in the heyday of 
federal activism and its decline in the conservative reckoning that followed – have con-
sistently been more extreme than those of other agencies subject to the same political 
environment.  And the political and social-movement forces that have attacked the NEA DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---5---  
in the past decade would not have done so had the climate of public opinion not rendered 
such attacks productive of political capital and direct-mail contributions.    
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze public opinion to better understand why a 
once popular federal agency has proven so politically vulnerable.  We make no attempt to 
present a full explanation of the NEA’s woes.
1  Rather we want to understand why the 
public’s good will towards the arts in general, and to the principle of federal aid to the 
arts in particular, failed to prevent them.  We do not imagine that what happens on 
Capitol Hill reflects public preferences in any simple manner (indeed, we show that in the 
case of the NEA it has not).  Rather, we view public opinion as a potential constraint up-
on the exercise of Congressional will and – to the extent that opinion has been organized 
around significant group affiliations and identities -- as a resource for social-movement 
entrepreneurs.  
We employ two kinds of data in this study.  First, we inspected marginals (and in 
some cases demographic breakdowns) of responses to more than fifty poll questions av-
ailable through the Roper Center Archive (Public Opinion Online).  (Questions were 
drawn from a keyword search based on the union of “government” and “arts.”)  Second, 
we reanalyzed data from ten national and local surveys (described briefly in Appendix 
Table 1 and at more length in Pettit [1997]) that contained questions about respondents’ 
attitudes towards government cultural programs.  
On the basis of analyses of these data, we conclude that: 
                                                 
1 For a perceptive analysis of the role of the NEA leadership’s strategic miscalculations, see Wyzomirski, 1994. DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---6---  
1.   Support for the principle of federal aid for the arts is broad but shallow.  The 
issue is not salient to most Americans, and most people know little about the NEA or its 
programs.  Consequently, many “opinions” are constructed on the spot, and the support 
for public funding apparent in many well publicized surveys is vulnerable to changes in 
item wording, questionnaire design, and the latest headlines about NEA grants to object-
ionable arts projects.    
2. The natural constituency for public support for the arts is cross-pressured and 
therefore difficult to mobilize.  To favor federal aid to artists and arts organizations, one 
must believe that the arts are valuable and be disposed to endorse an activist federal 
government.  But some of the most important predictors of participation in the arts (the 
best indicator of the value people place on them) also predict conservative views towards 
the federal role.  
3. By contrast to supporters of arts subsidies, a minority of 15 to 20 percent of the 
public, including both economic conservatives opposed to big government and cultural 
conservatives suspicious of the arts’ elitist and modernist image,  consistently has  fav-
ored cutting sharply or eliminating federal arts programs.  During the late 1980s and early 
1990s, this opposition became more effective because it crystallized around the 
institutional foci of party and church, as the conservative wing of the Republican Party 
and the Christian right made abolition of federal arts funding a major priority.  As is often 
the case, when a mobilized minority opposes a diffuse and weakly committed majority, 
the minority exerts a disproportionate influence on policy.    DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---7---  
  After briefly describing the recent history of the National Endowment for the arts 
as context, we present results of our analyses in four parts.  First, we report attitude trends 
to demonstrate that public opinion has fluctuated far less than has public policy.  Second, 
we describe the low salience of arts policy, as revealed both by direct questions and by 
the vulnerability of poll results to design factors; and note several significant qualificat-
ions to the public’s broad approval of government aid to the arts.  Third, we analyze the 
bases of support for federal arts programs, and find clues as to why such support has been 
difficult to convert to political advantage.  Finally, we explore the bases of opposition to 
federal arts spending, reporting shifts between 1985 and 1995 that made the NEA’s 
detractors more politically effective, while leaving aggregate opinion largely unchanged. 
  We focus on the National Endowment for the Arts because it (with its sister agen-
cy, the National Endowment for the Humanities) has been the foci of legislative cultural 
politics for almost thirty years, prospering during periods of congressional favor and 
suffering during periods of controversy.  Legislative appropriations also flow to the arts 
through direct assistance to specially chartered federal museums (e.g., the National Muse-
um of American Art or the National Gallery) and through grants to arts institutions from 
domestic programs established to support education, law enforcement, employment 
training, or community economic development, as well as through a few small, 
specialized programs such as the National Institute for Museum and Library Services and 
the General Services Administration’s Art-in-Architecture Program.  Although the 
volume of appropriations to federal museums and related agencies for artistic pro-
gramming and, before the Reagan administration, the volume of grants from non-arts DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---8---  
programs to arts institutions, has equaled or exceeded the grant budget of the Arts En-
dowment, such funding has produced less controversy (the former because it is more 
highly institutionalized and the latter because the funds were more difficult to trace).  
Because the NEA has employed the most discretion with the least direct control and the 
greatest public visibility, it has been the point around which the hopes of the “arts com-
munity” and the antagonism of opponents of government arts aid have crystallized.  
 
A Brief History of the National Endowment for the Arts 
The National Endowment for the Arts (and the Humanities Endowment, to which its for-
tunes have been joined) are products of the Great Society, created in 1965.  Although 
Lyndon Johnson founded the NEA, Richard Nixon was its unlikely champion, increasing 
appropriations at a dizzying rate throughout most of his presidency.  By FY79, the NEA 
budget had reached $150 million (National Endowment for the Arts 1998).  Nixon’s 
appointee as Endowment chairman, Nancy Hanks, was a skilled political strategist, who 
maintained excellent relations with Congress and the press.  When she departed in 1977, 
the honeymoon ended and for the first time, the NEA fell under widespread attack.  The 
grounds (not always consistent) would become familiar in the ensuing years: excessive 
elitism (spending too much on “high-culture” institutions in New York and Los Angeles 
and too little on struggling groups in rural areas and the inner-cities); and too much 
populism (as grants to organizations with strong ties to rural or inner-city communities 
were derided as support for “recreational art” or “social work”) (Biddle 1988).  In the DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---9---  
face of controversy, the Carter administration permitted the real value of the NEA’s 
appropriation to decline. 
  Although he once argued that Washington had no business in the arts, Ronald 
Reagan appointed a trusted aide to head (and, as it happened, to protect politically) the 
NEA.  Nonetheless, its appropriations, like those of other domestic programs, stagnated 
during the Reagan years (Figure 1).
2  During the Bush presidency, culture warriors of the 
religious right joined the agency’s fiscally conservative opponents: starting in summer 
1989, a series of grants to controversial projects were featured in conservative direct-mail 
campaigns.  In 1990, Congress increased from 20 to 27.5 percent the proportion of NEA 
program funds earmarked for state arts agencies and made other efforts to ensure that the 
agency would make no more controversial grants (DiMaggio 1991).   
Despite these reforms, an alliance of fiscal and social conservatives continued to 
campaign against the NEA, reducing the agency’s budget slightly in 1993 and in 1994.  
When Republicans assumed control of Congress in 1995, the party’s ascendant conser-
vative wing made abolishing the NEA a high priority.  In 1995, Congress slashed the En-
dowment’s appropriation from $162 million (FY95) to $99 million (FY96).  In 1997, the 
Senate-House conference punished the agency again by raising the percentage of its 
funds earmarked for the states to 40 percent and placing congressional representatives on 
its governing council (Wyzomirski 1994; Koch 1998).     
 
                                                 
 
2 The Reagan administration actually cut back federal support for the arts much more dramatically by eliminating or 
eviscerating many social programs, of which the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) was the most 
significant, that by 1980 probably channeled as much federal support to arts organizations as did the NEA.   DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---10---  
Trends in Public Opinion towards Government Support for the Arts 
What role has public opinion played in the NEA’s changing fortunes?  Did the public’s 
views of federal arts support change between the agency’s heyday in the 1970s and its 
chronic troubles after 1989?  To answer this question we must assemble responses to  it-
ems that different survey organizations have asked at different times.  These responses in-
dicate that public attitudes have been largely stable throughout this period.    
  The NEA was a by-product of the Great Society, created without benefit of public 
demand.  In 1963, the Opinion Research Corporation included “financial support for art-
ists and arts activities (theatres, orchestras, etc.)” among a set of issues about which a nat-
ional sample of respondents were asked whether there was a “need for action.”  Respond-
ents who said that there was at least some need, even if it was “not too urgent,” were 
asked what institutions should “handle primarily” society’s efforts.  Just over one quarter 
of respondents indicated that the arts needed action, and of these, only 17 percent felt that 
the federal government was the appropriate institution to lead the effort.  More 
respondents (21 percent) would have assigned the task to state or local government, the 
rest choosing voluntary agencies, individuals or business.  Thus two years before the 
NEA’s creation, only one in twenty Americans believed that the federal government 
should take the lead in assisting artists and arts organizations, and a similar number felt 
that state or local government should take initiative.  The other 90 percent preferred 
private leadership or, more often, saw no need for concerted action at all.
3 
                                                 
 
3 Roper Center Public Opinion On-Line, Acc. No. 0101206, Q 062. 
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  Once the NEA was established, however, the principle of federal support for the 
arts won relatively rapid acceptance.  The only long-term trend data available come from 
polls conducted for arts advocacy organizations by Louis Harris (through several research 
organizations) between 1975 and 1996.  In 1975, just over half of respondents to a 
complexly worded question who had an opinion endorsed direct government support to 
arts organizations.  Thereafter, the surveys employed a more straightforward wording: “If 
arts organizations – such as art museums, dance, opera and theater groups and symphony 
orchestras – need financial assistance to operate, do you feel that the federal government 
should provide assistance or not.”  Response categories were yes, no, and “not sure” 
(chosen by 3 to 5 percent of respondents each year).  Of respondents who expressed an 
opinion, the proportion endorsing federal arts support rose from 52 percent in 1980 to 62 
percent in 1987, dipping only slightly to 59 percent in 1996 (Figure 1).
4  In other words, 
support for the principal of federal arts aid rose during the Reagan years and held its 
own during a period in which the NEA faced a series of public relations debacles, lost 
much of its federal appropriation, and was a constant target of the religious right.
5 
                                                 
4 Figure 2 tracks the percentage of all respondents favoring federal aid to the arts (i.e., not just the percentage of those 
with opinions) and therefore reports slightly lower totals. 
 
5 The Harris surveys have been justifiedly criticized for their pro-arts bias (see Robinson 1989), but there is no reason 
to believe that the extent of that bias changed over the period reviewed here.  Indeed, two other polls that asked 
national samples whether they favored or opposed federal government financial aid to the arts after the crisis of the 
late 1980s reported majorities of 69 percent (People for the American Way, a liberal advocacy group, 1990: Roper 
Center, Public Opinion On-Line, Acc. No. 0108860, Q. 035) and 53 percent (Roper Center for Readers Digest, 1995; 
Roper Center, Public Opinion On-Line, Acc. No. 0247055, Q 028) in favor.   Only a 1989 Newsweek survey found a 
majority (57 percent) of those with opinions opposed to federal arts support.  But that poll was conducted at the 
height of the obscenity controversies and asked about support for “selected arts projects” – a phrase that many 
respondents doubtless took to refer to the specific projects currently in the news.  (An unusually high percentage of 
“don’t know” responses – 18 percent – also suggests that respondents found the question ambiguous.)(Roper Center 
Public Opinion On-Line, Acc. No. 0197360, Q 003.) DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---12---  
  From 1980 to 1986, the Harris surveys also included items comparing current per 
capita federal spending on defense, education and the arts and asking respondents if they 
would pay $25, $15, $10, or $5 more in taxes for arts support.  Responses to these items 
also exhibit much stability, but experience some erosion over the course of the NEA’s 
political travails (Figure 1).  Nonetheless, even in 1996 a cunningly designed question 
series could induce more than half of respondents to say they would pay $10 more in 
taxes so that the federal government could spend more money on the arts. 
  A third item repeated over a decade’s span provides further purchase on change in 
public attitudes towards federal support for the arts during the period during which the 
NEA was under fire.  In 1985, 1990, and 1996, the General Social Survey asked: 
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like 
to see more or less government spending in each area.  Remember if you say much more it might 
require a tax increase to pay for it.  
 
  One of the areas listed was “culture and the arts.”  Again, little change is evident 
between 1985 to 1996 (Figure 2).  To be sure, the proportion preferring “less spending” 
on the arts rose in 1996 (after declining between 1985 and 1990), but so did the much 
smaller percentage endorsing “more spending.”  As with the Harris question on willing-
ness to be taxed, the pattern indicates marginal erosion of support rather than anything 
resembling the dramatic shift evident in congressional voting patterns.    
  In short, the decline in the NEA’s fortunes occurred without much change in pub-
lic opinion.  Since 1975, Americans have endorsed the principle of federal assistance to 
the arts by small but durable margins.  Depending on question wording, they will al-DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---13---  
ternately volunteer to pay more federal taxes for the arts or opine that federal arts 
spending should be reduced.  But only modest erosion is evident, and only in the 1990s. 
  Thus we return to our original question.  If Americans love the arts and hold stable 
and moderately positive attitudes towards government assistance to arts organizations, 
then why has the National Endowment for the Arts experienced such changing fortunes 
and proven such a serviceable punching bag for political conservatives? 
 
The Low Salience of Arts Policy 
Attitudes are politically important to the extent that they can be transformed into action.  
If voters are poorly informed about a policy or agency and relatively indifferent to its 
fate, favorable attitudes will not protect it from political antagonists: Much research 
demonstrates that the degree to which policy decisions reflect public preferences is con-
ditional upon an issue’s salience (Monroe 1998).   Because the federal government pro-
vides only a miniscule proportion of the revenues of U.S. arts institutions (relative to its 
commanding budgetary position in such domains as welfare, education, health, and nat-
ional defense), it should not surprise us to find that government arts policy is relatively 
low in salience even to voters who care about the arts. 
When policies lack salience and respondents lack information, attitudes may be 
constructed during the survey interview itself (Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988; Zaller 
1992: chapter 2).  Such “constructedness” (and the low salience it reflects) is indicated 
when changes in question wording or context have large effects on responses.  This has 
been the case for public attitudes towards the NEA. DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---14---  
  First, consider the direct evidence.  In 1981 the Los Angeles Times asked a nation-
al adult sample “do you approve or disapprove of government funding for the arts?”  Aft-
er they had answered, the interviewer inquired: “do you feel strongly about that or not so 
strongly?”  Half the respondents reported that they did not have strong feelings (and 
another 12 percent could express no opinion at all).  The Times asked a similar question 
in 1989, and again fewer than 40 percent of voters described the positions they had ex-
pressed as “strong.”  More important, respondents were asked (as part of the initial 
question), “or haven’t you heard enough about that yet to say?”   Thus authorized, fully 
37 percent – as many as expressed strong views either way – reported that they knew too 
little to express an opinion.
  In 1995, as the Republican Congress engaged in an effort, 
accompanied by a vigorous campaign to sway public opinion, to eliminate the Endow-
ment, 66 percent of respondents to a Readers Digest  survey about proposed budget cuts 
reported that they had not “heard or read anything… lately” about the NEA.
 6  These 
reports suggest that most Americans are uninterested in and ill informed about arts policy 
and that, for the most part, their attitudes on the topic carry little conviction.    
  If this is correct, then we would expect the attitudes people express to vary from 
survey to survey, depending on how questions are worded and the context in which they 
are asked.  This is just what we find.  Take for example the trend questions we have 
already described.  When a series of questions about willingness to be taxed is embedded 
in a survey about the arts and their virtues, more than 60 percent of respondents volunteer 
                                                 
 
6Roper Center Public Opinion On-Line, Acc. No. 0079036, Q021; Acc. No. 0078316, Q040; 
Acc. No. 0247037, Q010.  For trends in press coverage of the NEA see Koch, 1998, fig. 3. DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---15---  
to pay more taxes in order for government to spend more on the arts – a position that pre-
sumably implies that one believes that government should spend more on the arts and, a 
fortiori, that one supports having a federal arts program.  But when the arts are included 
in a series of questions that focus on whether federal spending in a range of areas should 
go up or down, 15 percent or fewer advocate increased spending, with larger proportions 
(37 percent in 1996) wanting spending unchanged.    
  Indeed, when the issue is placed into the context of a presumed need to reduce 
federal spending, public opinion becomes even less sympathetic to arts funding.  This 
was the case in 1981, when the Roper organization described cuts in arts grants as part of 
“President Reagan’s economic plan…for cuts in federal government spending, and for 
cuts in taxes,” a framing that elicited support from 59 percent of respondents and clear 
opposition from just 20 percent.  A few weeks earlier, an ABC/Washington Post poll that 
asked simply if “spending … should be increased, decreased or left about the same” had 
reported that only 43 percent favored cuts, while 54 percent opposed them.
7    
The same pattern emerged in 1995 when the Republicans’ “Contract with Ameri-
ca” came before the nation.  Again neutrally phrased questions elicited broad support for 
the status quo.  For example, 58 percent of respondents to a Roper Center poll reported 
that they wanted federal aid to the arts to stay the same or increase.  And, again, questions 
with budget-cutting frames elicited budget-cutting responses, with between 47 and 69 
percent of respondents to several polls fielded between December 1994 and March 1995 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7 Roper Center Public Opinion On-Line, Acc. No. 0120435, Q002;  Acc. No. 0006869, Q048. DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---16---  
supporting reductions in federal assistance to the arts.
8  We conclude from the variability 
of results that many people's opinions about government assistance to the arts are ill-
formed, weakly held, and therefore up for grabs.  This finding in itself helps to explain 
the volatility of Congress’s treatment of the NEA, for policy makers are free to ignore 
public preferences on issues to the extent that the public is poorly informed and the issues 
are of low salience (Page and Shapiro 1983). 
There is a second reason that support for the arts is less robust than polling results 
suggest: people who respond positively to broadly worded questions may in fact favor 
some kinds of arts subsidies but oppose others.  If opponents of the NEA can shift the 
images people have in mind when they think about federal arts programs from the types 
people favor to the types they oppose, they can influence effective public opinion. 
  Americans’ support for arts funding is qualified in two ways.   First, slightly fewer 
respondents favor federal assistance to arts organizations than support state or local aid.  
In six surveys conducted between 1980 and 1996, the gap between the percentage of 
respondents endorsing federal support and the percentage endorsing state or local support 
ranged from zero to 14 percent, with a median difference of 8 percent.  (The gap appears 
to have diminished slightly since the first term of the Reagan administration.)
9  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
8 Roper Center Public Opinion Online, Acc. No. 0228755, Q026 (L.A. Times); Acc. No. 0247038, Q011 (Roper 
Center, Institute for Social Inquiry); Acc. No. 0228388, Q033 (Princeton Survey Research Associates). 
 
9Roper Center Public Opinion Online, Acc. No. 0069536, Q131-33  (American Council for the Arts, 1980), Acc. No. 
0121148, Q071 (Roper Organization, 1981), Acc. No. 0071287, Q125-27 (National Research Center of the Arts, 
1984) Acc. No. 0072953, Q143-45 (Louis Harris, 1987), Acc. No. 0220081, Q096-98 (Louis Harris, 1992); and 
Americans for the Arts 1996: 28. 
 DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---17---  
  Second, respondents consistently have favored public funding of arts organizations 
more strongly than they have favored government grants to individual artists.  In five 
surveys conducted between 1980 and 1995, the gap between endorsement of federal 
support for organizations and approval of federal aid to individual artists ranged from 8 
percent (1992) to 26 percent (1995), with a median difference of 16 percent.
10  
  In other words, the public  appears to support arts funding most strongly when 
local governments assist nonprofit arts organizations.  Support for federal-government 
grants to individual professional artists is considerably weaker.  Given this, it is no ac-
cident that the NEA’s antagonists emphasized the results of its artist fellowships and that, 
even when grants to organizations were at issue, critics focussed public attention upon 
individual artists whose work those grants purportedly supported.  And it is un-
derstandable why, lacking the votes to eliminate the agency, the NEA’s opponents man-
dated that ever larger shares of its program funds be passed on to state arts agencies.  Un-
bundling the issue of public arts support in this way has permitted opponents to attack the 
aspects of the NEA’s mission and charter that enjoy the weakest public support.  
 
Why Support for Government Arts Programs is Soft and Opposition Hard 
We have explained why some poll results overestimate the depth of public support for 
federal government arts programs.  Even so, it is also clear that the extent of such support 
                                                 
10  The large gap in 1995 may reflect the fact that a different survey organization conducted 
that study and used slightly different questions.   Roper Center Public Opinion Online, Acc. No. 
0069536, Q131, 134  (American Council for the Arts, 1980), Acc. No. 0071287, Q125, 128 (National Research 
Center of the Arts, 1984) Acc. No. 0072953, Q143, 146 (Louis Harris, 1987), Acc. No. 0220081, Q096, 099 (Louis 
Harris, 1992); Acc. No. 0247055, Q028, 029 (Reader’s Digest, Institute for Social Inquiry, 1995). 
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is relatively high and has been so since the 1970s.  As we have seen, when questions are 
asked in a consistent manner, stable majorities support the principle of government 
support for the arts, but few of them want to increase the amount of that support and even 
fewer want to increase it by very much.  Similarly, a much larger group favors reducing 
federal spending and a small but stable subset of these feel strongly about it.  Moreover, 
these proportions appear to be unaffected by the actual size of the federal arts budget, 
persisting during good times and bad for the NEA.   
  In other words, public support for government assistance to the arts is broad but 
shallow.  It is shallow in two senses: federal arts support is not highly salient to even to 
many people who say they support it; and, given an opportunity, supporters tend to 
choose moderate over strong positions in its favor.  More people say they approve of 
federal assistance than say they oppose it.  But fewer than one in ten of those who 
approve would increase support levels sharply. 
  By contrast, opposition is narrow but deep.  Many opponents would like to cut 
subsidies sharply or even do away with them altogether.  Moreover, given the propensity 
of poll respondents to report that they want to increase spending on services that they 
value (at the same time they indicate in response to other items that they want lower 
taxes), this pattern shows decided softness in public support for the arts, compared to 
support for many other government functions (Hansen 1998).
11      
                                                 
11The 1996 GSS asked respondents their views of the appropriate level of federal spending on the environment, 
health, police and other anti-crime programs, education, national defense, retirement benefits, unemployment benefits 
and the arts.  Despite a tradeoff frame (respondents were told that large increases in spending would require paying 
higher taxes), more than three quarters of respondents supported more spending on education and more than two 
thirds favored increased spending on health.  Indeed, of the eight domains of federal action, fewest people supported DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---19---  
  The fact that support for arts spending is weaker than for many other functions 
and, in particular, the fact that numerous, weakly committed  supporters are arrayed 
against a smaller set of more intensely committed opponents in itself explains much of 
the NEA’s political vulnerability.  Strong opponents can mobilize more effectively and 
apply more credible pressure upon legislators (especially when their preferences are 
packaged into the agendas of powerful movement groups) than weak supporters (Arnold 
1990).   But this pattern, which has existed at least since 1985 (when the GSS first asked 
about attitudes towards federal arts spending), cannot account for the dramatic shift in 
Congress’s treatment of the arts in the late 1980s.  To explain this, we must examine how 
the composition of the public most opposed to arts spending changed between 1985 and 
1996.  In the rest of this paper we explain why support for federal funding is broad but 
shallow, why opposition is narrow and deep, and why this narrow, deep opposition 
became more consequential by the late 1980s.        
 
Shallow Support 
Support for government assistance to the arts is shallow, in part, because supporters are 
cross-pressured.  The two best predictors of support for government spending on the arts 
are whether one values the arts highly oneself and whether one believes in active govern-
ment.   People who attend lots of arts events can be expected to support greater arts 
spending for reasons both public-spirited (they believe more strongly than other people in 
the arts’ value to society) and self-interested (government arts programs may subsidize 
                                                                                                                                                             
increases in support for the arts (15.8 percent, compared to 21.2 percent for national defense), and the greatest 
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ticket prices).  People who believe that government should be expanded and who attend 
lots of arts events tend to favor more spending on the arts.  People who do not, tend to 
oppose it.  Mobilizing support for the arts is difficult because many people who 
participate actively in the arts (and therefore value them highly) also have reservations 
about federal government activism. 
  To explore these relationships one would ideally use recent national data on arts 
participation, support for government activism, and attitudes towards federal arts spend-
ing.   As no single data set meets all of these criteria, we draw on several.   First we 
demonstrate the impact of arts participation on support for federal arts programs, using 
the Americans and the Arts surveys for 1980, 1987, and 1992.   Then we demonstrate the 
effect of support for expansive government on advocacy of increases in federal arts 
spending, using the General Social Surveys for 1985, 1990, and 1996.  Next we analyze 
one national survey and two state surveys that permit us to examine a full set of 
predictors of support for increased arts spending.  
  Arts participation and support of federal subsidies to arts organizations. Table 1 
reports two models (one without and one with arts participation included) predicting sup-
port for federal subsidies to arts organizations among respondents to the 1980, 1987, and 
1992 Americans and the Arts surveys.  (We measure arts participation  as the sum 
[standardized to range from 0 to 1] of the types of presentations or exhibits of nonprofit 
arts organizations [some subset of the following:  live plays, classical music performan-
ces, opera or musical theatre performances, ballet or dance performances, or exhibits in 
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art galleries or art museums] in which respondents reported participating in the previous 
year.)  Beginning with the first model, in each year, African-Americans and women were 
more likely than people of other races and men (respectively) to favor arts subsidies; and 
age was strongly associated with opposition to federal arts funding.   Residents of the 
northeast (the omitted category to which the regions included in the model are compared) 
were more likely in each year to favor arts subsidies than otherwise similar people living 
in the south, midwest and, except for 1992, the western states.   In 1980 and 1987, when 
the survey included a question about religion, Protestants were less likely to endorse 
government arts assistance than otherwise similar Catholics, Jews, or persons without 
religious affiliation.  Surprisingly, with one unimportant exception, education does not 
significantly influence views on this issue.
12   
  When a scale measuring arts participation is added to the models, in each year it is 
a very strong predictor of support for federal arts subsidies, dwarfing the effects of other 
predictors except for age and race (which are probably proxies for attitudes towards 
active government, with which they are correlated in most surveys).  Moreover, the 
coefficients of other predictors are in almost every case reduced (usually only mod-
erately), indicating that some of their effect reflects differences in patterns of participat-
ion in the arts.  Entering arts participation also reduces dramatically (1987) or eliminates 
                                                 
12 The exception, the strong tendency of respondents with less than a high school education to support arts funding in 
1980, is inconsistent with the results of all other studies, and may stem either from a statistical fluke or from some 
unreported aspect of sample design that may have led to an oversampling of middle-class high school students likely to 
endorse government aid.  In any case, we are inclined to discount it. 
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completely (1980 and 1992) the tendency of college graduates to favor arts subsidies 
more than persons whose education concluded with graduation from high school. 
  Support for active government and support for increased spending on the arts.  
Because these Americans and the Arts surveys did not include questions about support 
for increasing the extent of government participation in the arts and other areas, we turn 
to the General Social Surveys for 1985, 1990, and 1996, which included questions (de-
scribed in detail earlier) about whether respondents favored increasing or reducing fed-
eral government spending on “culture and the arts.”  For each data set, two models are 
presented, one without and one with support for government activism included.   Support 
for government activism is measured as the sum of responses (rescaled to make higher 
values more supportive) to questions about the desirability of spending less, the same 
amount, or more on several kinds of government domestic programs (not includeing 
culture and the arts).   (See Appendix Table 1 for details of variable construction.) 
The major predictor of support for greater arts spending in all three years  is 
support for more active government in other areas of domestic spending.  People who 
think government should spend more on the environment, health, or aid to the poor also 
think it should spend more on culture and the arts.  The impact of support for more active 
government on attitudes towards federal arts spending was very strong throughout, 
although it dipped somewhat in 1990, when press reports of controversial NEA grants 
were at their peak.  The other principal predictor of support for higher arts budgets is 
formal education.  Men and women with college degrees are significantly more likely to 
support increased arts spending than otherwise similar people with only high school DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---23---  
degrees or less.   In the 1990 and 1996 General Social Surveys, respondents with some 
college were also significantly more favorable to federal arts spending than people with 
less education.
13    
Finally, African-Americans were more likely to favor increased arts spending than 
persons of other races (a difference that became insignificant when support for 
government activism was entered into the model, reflecting the greater propensity of 
African-Americans to support an active federal government, rather than special support 
for the arts.)    
Other effects were visible only in one of the three years, with Catholics turning 
against federal arts funding at the height of the controversy over Endowment support for 
blasphemous artworks, and Evangelicals less likely than others to endorse increases in 
federal support in 1996.   None of these predictors approached the significance of general 
orientation towards active government, however. 
The cross-pressured arts supporter.   So far we have established that people’s 
attitudes towards government support for the arts are heavily influenced by how much 
they personally attend the kinds of arts activities that government subsidizes, and by their 
general view of government.  Support for the arts is blunted and difficult to turn into 
political capital, we argue, because these two primary predictors work at cross-purposes: 
some factors that are positively associated with attending lots of arts events are also 
associated with skepticism about federal spending.    
                                                 
13 Why education has a strong effect on support for increased arts spending but weak or nonexistent effects on support 
for the principle of federal assistance to arts and cultural organizations is an intriguing puzzle beyond the scope of this 
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  We begin by focussing on four surveys that collected data on both arts partic-
ipation and support for active government: Americans and the Arts, 1975; the General 
Social Survey, 1993; and 1989 state surveys in New Jersey and Kentucky (see Table 3).  
In all four, the leading predictor of arts participation is having a college degree (with high 
school completion the omitted education category).  In all four surveys, college graduates 
are  less supportive of activist government than high school graduates, with the difference 
significant in the 1989 Kentucky state survey.  Income is positively and significantly 
related to arts participation in all four surveys, and negatively related to support for 
activist government (significantly so in the 1975 Americans and the Arts survey).   In 
other words, we observe a tendency for high status people to attend arts events (which 
tends to increase support for government arts programs) and to oppose activist 
government (which tends to reduce it).    
To some extent this conflict is moderated by the tendency of arts attenders to be 
more supportive of most kinds of government spending than sociodemographically sim-
ilar nonattenders.  Nonetheless, that even small associations of this kind may erode po-
tential political support for the arts is evident in the coefficients of “Education: BA or 
greater” in Table 2 before and after one controls for general orientations towards govern-
ment spending.  The difference between the first and second coefficients represents the 
dampening effect of cross-pressuring on the extent to which the greater tendency of col-
lege graduates to attend arts events can be converted into political support for federal and 
state arts agencies.   In 1985 this dampening effect was 34 percent.  In 1990, when 
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public finance, the greater tolerance of the highly educated for sexually explicit and 
sacrilegious expression counteracted differences in fiscal attitudes, resulting in a decline 
of just 3 percent when fiscal philosophy is omitted from the model.   But in 1996, it was 
evident again, with 32 percent of the influence of education on support for higher arts 
budgets suppressed by the relatively conservative fiscal views of the highly educated. 
  We can illustrate this by using one national survey (Americans and the Arts 1975) 
and two state-level surveys (New Jersey and Kentucky, both 1989), that include measures 
of both arts participation and of attitudes towards public expenditures.  The data in the 
two state surveys are different from others we have looked at because respondents were 
asked about their attitudes towards state (not federal) government spending on the arts 
and other areas of government responsibility.  But the predictors of support for increased 
state arts spending are similar to those predicting support for more federal arts assistance 
in surveys that include questions about each, so we believe that the benefits of being able 
to include both attitudes towards government and arts participation in the same model are 
sufficient to warrant attending to these data. 
  The state surveys were conducted by the University of Kentucky Survey Research 
Center and the Eagleton Institute of Rutgers University in spring of 1989, just before the 
outbreak of controversy over NEA grants in support of objectionable art works.  Each 
was an omnibus survey that asked respondents about many different behaviors and 
opinions, but included several questions about the arts.  Almost half of respondents in 
each state wanted arts funding to say the same.  Kentuckians were slightly more likely to 
favor increasing spending (38 to 35 percent) and more than twice as likely to have no DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---26---  
opinion (9 to 4 percent).   New Jerseyans were almost three times as likely to advocate 
cutting the arts budget (14 to 5 percent).  This difference may well be a product of 
question wording (see Appendix Table 1): the Kentucky survey asked about arts funding 
as a follow-on to a question about the value of arts education (a popular subject liable to 
trigger positive associations), whereas the New Jersey survey embedded the question 
about arts spending in a set of similar items about several types of state spending (in-
voking a comparative-priorities frame) and explicitly headed the question with a refer-
ence to state taxes.  
  Nonetheless, results of regression analyses reported in Table 4 are strikingly 
similar in the most important respects.  For each survey, three models are presented.  The 
first depicts attitudes towards state arts spending as a function of race, educational attain-
ment, income level, gender, age, party affiliation, religion and (for the national survey) 
region.  The second adds support for more active government to the first model.  The 
third includes arts participation as well.     
  The first model indicates that higher levels of education are associated with sup-
port for federal and state arts spending, even after one controls for income, race, and 
other factors.  In the 1975 national study and in New Jersey (but not in Kentucky), Af-
rican-Americans were significantly more supportive of public arts support than whites.  
In the national study and in Kentucky (but not in New Jersey), elderly respondents were 
less likely to support increased arts funding than others.  Women were significantly more 
supportive of federal funding, and Protestants less so, in the older national survey, but did 
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  When attitudes towards other government programs are introduced in model 2, 
they become by far the strongest predictors of support for budget expansion in all three 
surveys, eliminating the significant impact of race nationally (but not in New Jersey) and 
reducing the significance of age, especially in the national sample.   The respondent’s 
own participation in the arts also proves a strongly significant predictor of attitudes 
towards arts funding, reducing the effects of higher education without altering the impact 
of broader attitudes towards government spending.  Indeed, after one controls for arts 
participation, the views of college graduates are not significantly different from those of 
high school graduates in either of the state surveys, and the national difference also 
declines.  Taken together, the results suggest that between 25 and 40 percent of the 
tendency of college graduates to support higher arts budgets more than other people re-
flects the fact that they attend more arts events.    
  The dampening effect of the tendency of  college graduates to  be less supportive 
of higher federal and state budgets can be estimated by comparing the coefficients for 
“Education: BA or greater” in the first two models.  In effect, the coefficient for the sec-
ond model in each set indicates how much more strongly college graduates would sup-
port increased arts spending than high school graduates if  they were as supportive of 
government spending increases in general.  Calculated this way, the dampening effect of 
fiscal conservatism reduces the difference between college graduates’ and high-school 
graduates’ views by about 25 percent in the 1975 national study and in Kentucky, and by 
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  Taken together, the analyses we have reviewed suggest that fiscal conservatism 
notably suppresses the tendency of highly educated people to support increased arts 
funding.  (It has a similar impact on the views of high-income respondents, but the effects 
of income on attitudes towards arts spending are negligible once we control for the 
influence of educational attainment.)  The problem that arts advocates face is that in the 
real world of politics, people come with all their variables intact, and particular attributes 
or political preferences cannot be controlled away.   
The different size of the “dampening effect” in different surveys suggests two 
tentative conclusions.  First, questions that referred explicitly to the tax consequences of 
increased spending revealed stronger dampening effects than those that did not.   Second, 
the one survey in which the dampening effect was trivial was administered at the peak of 
controversy over NEA grants in support of allegedly pornographic art works.   This 
pattern suggests that the way in which political debates are framed matters.  The greater 
the salience of fiscal considerations, the more cross-pressured will the arts’ constituency 
be and the less their affection for and interest in the arts will translate into political 
support.  But when the debate over arts funding is shifted to such grounds as freedom of 
expression, the dampening effect is minimized.    
  
Deep Opposition 
We have portrayed support for government arts programs as high, broad, stable and 
shallow.   Moreover, we have identified what we believe is a structural impediment to the 
success of arts advocacy efforts  in the cross-pressuring effects of arts participation and DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---29---  
fiscal conservatism on attitudes towards government arts programs.   We used 
information from surveys undertaken in several places at many times to build this 
argument, for the condition has been chronic, at least over the past several decades.  
  If explaining the shallowness of support for government arts programs requires 
portraiture, explaining the depth of opposition requires narrative, for there is evidence 
that the nature and effectiveness of opposition has changed over the past fifteen years, 
and that these changes are at the heart of the NEA’s travails.  It is not that opposition to 
federal arts programs has increased very much – we have already demonstrated that the 
proportion of Americans who advocate dramatic cuts in federal cultural programs has 
been relatively stable for a long time.  Rather the nature of the opposition has changed as 
Republican partisans and social conservatives have made eliminating the Arts Endow-
ment a central item in their political agendas.  
  In these analyses we will focus on people who took the most negative position on 
federal spending for the arts in the1985, 1990, and 1996 General Social Surveys --- men 
and women who told interviewers that they “would like to see” government “spend much 
less” on “culture and the arts.” (Using a single survey administered by the same 
organization over several years enables us to see change most clearly, because it elimin-
ates most of the design, sampling, or other methodological influences that can create ar-
tifactual differences in the results of otherwise similar studies.)  The proportion of re-
spondents reporting such strongly negative attitudes towards federal arts spending re-
mained stable between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s:  15 percent in 1985, 16 percent DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---30---  
in 1990, and 18 percent in 1996.   These respondents represent the solid core of 
opposition to the NEA.    
  Change in the composition of this group is clearly visible both in frequency 
distributions (Appendix 2) and when we inspect logistic regression models predicting 
endorsement of “much less” government spending on culture and the arts (Table 5).  As 
the debate over the NEA heated up --- and as opponents shifted the frames of their ar-
guments from public finance to public morality (Moen 1997: 191) --- opposition to cuts 
came from the most educated respondents, those with college degrees or more.  By 1990, 
as the NEA budget became increasingly politicized, respondents with one to three years 
of college were also less likely than otherwise similar people to favor sharp reductions in 
federal spending.  The elderly were less likely than others to favor much less federal arts 
support in 1990 (hewing to the middle of the road rather than supporting increases), but 
not in other years.   Women were significantly less likely to advocate strong cuts in 1996, 
though coefficients similar to those observed in 1985 suggest that 1990 was the more 
unusual pattern.  (Some women’s support for arts spending appears to have been reduced 
that year by the attack on the NEA.)   Finally, southerners were significantly more likely 
than northeasterners to support budget cuts in 1996. 
  The most striking trend, clearly a product of conservative social-movement ac-
tivity within the Evangelical movement and the Republican Party, was the emergence of 
political affiliation and religious faith as the major predictors of opposition to federal arts 
support.  By 1996, being a strong Republican or a regularly church-going evangelical 
Christian overshadowed all other factors but attitudes towards government.   DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---31---  
  What is so striking about this is the rapidity with which it occurred.   In 1985, 
when the GSS first asked about attitudes towards arts spending --- before the NEA faced 
accusations of support for pornographic and blasphemous art ---  Evangelical Christians 
were actually somewhat less likely than otherwise similar Americans to support sharp re-
ductions in federal arts spending.  (They were also disinclined to seek increases, instead 
tending to support the status quo.)   Yet within five years, they were strongly more 
supportive of steep cuts than non-Evangelicals and their opposition continued to increase 
through 1996, when 28 percent of regularly church-going Evangelicals called for much 
less arts spending. 
The shift by Republicans was even more dramatic.  In 1985 and 1990, self-ident-
ified strong Republicans were not significantly more likely (after controlling for income, 
age, religion and other factors) than anyone else to favor sharp cuts in the NEA budget.  
In 1985, the right had yet to target the NEA, which was chaired by a Reagan appointee 
with strong conservative credentials; and even in 1990, the right’s attack on the Endow-
ment was viewed as an effort to embarrass the Republican administration.  By contrast, 
by 1996, with a Democrat in the White House, “strong Republicans” were far more likely 
to endorse sharp federal arts spending cuts than otherwise similar respondents.   By that 
year, 37 percent of such respondents favored sharp reductions, compared to just 16 
percent in 1985.   This suggests strongly that the Republican right’s efforts to politicize 
the NEA had succeeded in influencing the views of the party faithful.   
  In sum, the evidence that the conservative offensive succeeded in shaping public 
opinion is compelling --- but it shaped opinion very selectively.  Between 1985 and 1996, DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---32---  
Republican party identification and active membership in an Evangelical Christian 
religious denomination --- two factors that were not even significantly related to attitudes 
towards arts spending in 1985 --- became the strongest predictors of  support for sharp 
cuts in government arts and cultural spending.   This mobilization succeeded to the extent 
that it did --- and, we would suggest, was effective in shaping the legislative agenda --- 
because it was organizationally based in institutions that compelled the active loyalty of 
the people whose views they shaped.
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  To grasp the importance of this point, consider the changing impact of active 
membership in the Catholic church on attitudes towards federal arts funding.  Catholic 
lay groups were actively involved in criticism of the NEA for funding Serrano’s “Piss 
Christ” photograph.   But the Church as a whole has not been directly involved at the 
congregational level in the cultural struggles of the Christian Right (except, of course, 
around opposition to abortion).   By contrast, some Evangelical congregations have act-
ively supported Christian conservative groups, providing a strong base for recruitment 
and communication of ideas and political appeals.  As Table 5 indicates, Catholics joined 
Evangelicals in turning against the NEA in 1990.  Whereas in 1985, Catholics were less 
likely (albeit not significantly) than others to favor cutting the federal arts budget 
                                                 
 
14 For an account of this political mobilization, see Koch, 1998.  The emergence of strong independent effects of 
Evangelical religious participation and partisan Republicanism is all the more striking because Evangelical affiliation 
became a strong predictor of Republican partisanship during the 1980s and early 1990s, thus increasing the 
correlation between the two predictors (Layman 1997).  In analyses not reported here, we tested for the possibility that 
opposition to arts funding was driven less by Republican partisanship or evangelical  Protestantism alone, but by the 
combination of the two, such that opposition would be concentrated among active participants in the religious right.  
Curiously, this hypothesis (tested by adding an interaction effect to the second model under each year in Table 5) was 
rejected, indicating that the effects of religion and partisanship are additive. 
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substantially, in 1990 their support for sharp reductions was every bit as strong as that of 
Evangelical Christians.   But, lacking an organizational base in the Church for anti-NEA 
efforts, Catholic opposition ebbed, and in 1996 the views of regularly church-going 
Catholics were very similar to those of other Americans on this issue. 
  Similarly, one might have expected that the Maplethorpe exhibit, which graphical-
ly depicted sex acts between men, would have turned homophobes against arts programs.  
But, once again, the absence of a strong social-movement base appears to have deterred 
such a shift.  We examined the relationship between a GSS item measuring attitudes 
towards homosexuality and the GSS measure of attitudes towards government arts 
funding in 1985 (before the controversy), 1990 (at the height of it), and 1996.  Two 
findings are striking:  First, attitudes towards homosexuality were significantly associated 
with attitudes towards government arts funding in all three years, with bivariate 
correlations ranging from .19 to .25, and with partial correlations (controlling for age, 
education, gender, income, race, and active membership in an Evangelical denomination) 
ranging from .14 to .19.  Second, contrary to our expectation, correlations were actually 
somewhat lower at the height of the Maplethorpe controversy than in 1985 or 1990.  
These results provide additional support for the view that opinion change requires or-
ganization, at least for issues that, like arts funding, are low in salience.
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15 As part of a series of questions about sexual behavior, the GSS asked respondents: “What about sexual relations 
between two adults of the same sex – do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or 
not wrong at all?  Correlations were .249 (.187 partial) in 1985, .190 (.140 partial) in 1990, and .246 (.193) in 1996.   
One might speculate that the small but counterintuitive decline in 1990 probably reflected the low salience of arts 
policy to individuals strongly opposed to homosexuality at a time when other groups (especially evangelical Christians, 
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  Note that the transformation in public attitudes toward federal arts funding oc-
curred beneath the surface of survey marginals, which, as we have seen, remained largely 
stable since at least 1980.  What we see in Table 5 is not an increase in opposition to 
federal arts spending, but rather a consolidation of the base of opposition in an alliance of 
social conservatives and Republican partisans, identities connected, respectively, to 
powerful social-movement and political-party organizations.   
We suspect that it is this effective articulation of opinion to powerful and organ-
ized social identities that has enabled a minority of dedicated opponents to keep the maj-
ority of survey respondents who generally support the principle of federal assistance to 
the arts at a standoff, permitting the NEA’s perils to become one of the United States’ 
longest-running political dramas.  This articulation raises the potential cost to legislators 
of support for the NEA by making it easier for their opponents to identify “latent publics” 
(Arnold 1990) who will punish them for their votes.  And the concentration of anti-
Endowment sentiment among Republican partisans, especially, explains why the NEA 
typically has fared much worse in the House, where decisions typically reflect “the vote 
of the majority party in caucus,”  than in the Senate since 1995 (Hansen 1998: 520).  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have tried to understand why federal arts programs have been so vul-
nerable despite the fact that public opinion polls generally show that most Americans 
support federal government assistance to the arts.  Although we do not assume that leg-
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legislative action with enough regularity that apparent exceptions to this rule require 
explanation. 
  After reviewing responses to fifty-five opinion questions and undertaking second-
ary analysis of eight national and two statewide opinion surveys, we conclude that federal 
arts programs are vulnerable because their support, although broad, is shallow; whereas 
the opposition, while limited, runs deep.  Support is shallow in two senses.  First, 
respondents report having little information about arts policy.  The low salience of arts 
issues is indicated by large effects of relatively small variations in question wording on 
distributions of responses.  Second, supporters of the NEA tend to choose moderate 
rather than strong positions when given the choice.  Support for federal arts spending is 
dampened because such attributes as high education and high incomes that are associated 
with attending arts events also tend to be associated with fiscal conservatism.    
There is every reason to believe that arts policy has been low in salience and arts 
supporters have been cross-pressured since the creation of the NEA in 1965.  These 
conditions explain why federal arts programs are potentially vulnerable, but they do not 
explain why the Endowment’s political environment turned so perilous in the late 1980s.  
The answer lies in change in the composition of the federal program’s antagonists.  the 
potential effectiveness of opposition to federal cultural programs grew between 1985 and 
1996 due to the articulation of anti-NEA sentiment to organized political actors, 
specifically conservative religious groups and the Republican Party.  
At least two consequences followed from this articulation of opposition to party 
and church.  First, it reduced the cost of rallying opponents of the NEA, who could now DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---36---  
be reached efficiently through specialized channels of communication, such as the media 
of the religious right.  Second, it encouraged both the Christian right and Republican 
conservatives to keep the controversy alive as a means of rallying their core supporters, 
even when it appeared that they would not succeed in their policy objectives. 
   We contend that the climate of opinion we have described tends to make federal 
arts programs politically vulnerable, not  that it suffices to account for the National En-
dowment for the Arts’ problems in itself.  As Wyzomirski (1994) argues, some blame for 
the outcome must fall on the strategic ineptness of NEA leadership at the onset of the 
crisis.  Moreover, the Endowment’s enemies appear to have gauged public opinion more 
shrewdly (or perhaps more fortuitously) than its supporters in three ways.  First, support-
ing the redistribution of public money from the NEA to state arts agencies was consistent 
with the public’s stronger support of state and local than of federal arts subsidies.  
Second, by basing their attacks on the NEA’s support for individual artists (even when 
those artists were in fact assisted indirectly through grants to arts organizations) critics 
took advantage of the fact that the public favors federal support to artists less strongly 
than government aid to arts organizations.  Finally, by using the organizational muscle of 
the religious right and conservative Republican groups, opponents built a coalition that 
could be mobilized more easily than could the federal arts agency’s more numerous, but 
more ambivalent and less organizationally focussed, supporters.  Thus, even as the 
percentage of Americans advocating large cuts in federal arts spending remained stable, 
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  Given all this, one might well ask why the NEA survived the onslaught at all.   
Part of the answer lies in the different forms of interest aggregation in the House and the 
Senate.   As Hansen (1998) argues, the House, with its strong party discipline, tends to 
reflect the opinion of the dominant party (in this case, the Republican partisans eager to 
eliminate the NEA), whereas Senators tend to represent the views of their states’ median 
voters (who, by and large, favor federal support for the arts).  Consistent with this 
analysis, the Senate repeatedly has rescued the NEA from punitive action by the House.   
Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that this pattern will continue, because support for fed-
eral arts assistance is probably too diffuse to constitute an effective political force.   One 
can well imagine that a Republican President might find termination of the NEA an 
inexpensive way to shore up his or her standing among the Republican core, and might 
convince a majority of Senators to accept his or her decision. 
To be sure, these explanations rest on considerable interpretation.   More research 
is needed on variation in support for subsidies to different kinds of cultural organizations 
and practitioners; on beliefs about the NEA and other state and federal arts programs (and 
on the relationship between perceptions and policy preferences); and on the priority that 
arts supporters place on cultural programs relative other federal domestic activities.  
Experimental surveys capable of estimating the impact of different frames on support for 
arts programs would also be useful in helping us understand the bases of support for and 
opposition to federal cultural programs among different groups.    
A final point regards the possible generalizability of our findings to other policy 
issues.  Congress’s treatment of the NEA has been unusual, but not unique.   During the DiMaggio and Pettit: Attitudes Towards Federal Arts Support ---38---  
past decade, a range of issues associated with the putative “culture war” between Americ-
ans with secular and orthodox values have generated considerable controversy at the 
same time that attitude surveys have demonstrated stable or even declining polarization in 
public opinion (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996).  Our results suggest the possibility 
that the processes we identified as dampening support and strengthening the effectiveness 
of opposition to federal arts funding may prove to be significant in other policy arenas.  
Certainly, there are other arenas in which fiscal conservatism reduces the strength of 
support for federal spending for purposes that well-educated and well-to-do voters other-
wise would favor.   
Similarly, our findings underscore the importance of considering both public 
opinion and social movement activity in explaining changes in government policies 
(Burstein 1998).  Much social-movement activity aimed at educating and mobilizing a 
base of institutionally-connected voters may tend to influence the composition of opinion 
groups without necessarily changing the overall distribution of opinion.  The possibility 
that other cases in which changing policies are unaccompanied by apparent change in 
public opinion are characterized by some combination of the low salience, cross-
pressuring and opinion-focussing that we have seen in the arena of cultural policy 
appears worthy of investigation.  
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Table 1: Predictors of Support for Federal Assistance to Arts Organizations:  
Americans and the Arts, 1980, 1987, and 1992 
 
                                               1980                                      1987                                           1992 
Race: Black  .638**  .572**  .801***  .764***  .949***  .976***   
  (.193)  (.196) (.230)  (.230) (.265)  (.266)   
 
Race:  Other  -.039  -.063 .491  .508 .637  .618 
  (.306)  (.307) (.313)  (.315) (.314)  (.316) 
 
Education:   .232  -.071 .264  .112 .039  -.155 
BA or greater  (.154)  (.165)  (.153)  (.160)  (.149)  (.157) 
  
Education:  .117 -.050  -.074  -.156  .099 -.010 
Some  college  (.155)  (.159) (.146)  (.149) (.156)  (.159) 
 
Education: .680***  .761***  .223  .259  -.298  -.272 
Less than high school  (.175)  (.178)  (.198)  (.200)  (.211)  (.213)   
 
Income  (logged)  -.059  -.135 -.053  -.117 -.091  -.139 
  (.088)  (.090) (.087)  (.089) (.080)  (.082) 
 
Gender:  Female  .275* .243*  .248*  .207  .280* .263* 
  (.115)  (.116) (.117)  (.118) (.117)  (.118) 
 
Age  -.037***  -.036*** -.029***  -.029*** -.033***  -.033*** 
  (.004)  (.004) (.004)  (.004) (.004)  (.004) 
 
Residence:  South  -.451**  -.450** -.485**  -.470** -.355*  -.297 
  (.158)  (.160) (.162)  (.162) (.159)  (.161) 
 
Residence:  West  -.523**  -.572** -.458*  -.486** -.324  -.322 
  (.182)  (.185) (.180)  (.181) (.179)  (.180) 
  
Residence:  Midwest  -.354*  -.370* -.395*  -.387* -.390*  -.347* 
  (.159)  (.161) (.167)  (.168) (.168)  (.169) 
 
Religion: Protestant
1   -.538***  -.494***  -.274*  -.244   
 (.126)  (.127)  (.124)  (.125) 
 
Arts Participation    1.231***    .707***    .859*** 
    (.213)  (.209)   (.195) 
 
 
Intercept  2.366  2.706 2.371  2.803 2.758  3.073 
degrees  freedom  1393  1393 1389  1389 1348  1348 
-2 log likelihood  1783.206  1748.795  1766.641  1755.071  1726.976  1707.157 
 
*  p<.05             **p<.01          ***p<.001 
1No question about religion was included in the 1992 survey.  
Table 2:  Predictors of Support for Greater Arts Spending: 
General Social Survey, 1985, 1990, 1996 
      
                                                                    GSS1985                   GSS1990                         GSS1996                        
Race:  Black  1.135**  .315  .727*  .570 .601*  -.119  
  (.391)  (.463)  (.303) (.317)  (.240) (.266)   
 
Race:  Other  1.076  .441  .016 -.015  .165 -.156   
  (.658)  (.740)  (.572) (.589)  (.360) (.392)   
 
Education: BA or greater  .951**  1.439***  1.576***  1.618***  .925***  1.366***   
  (.333)  (.375)  (.274) (.286)  (.238) (.260)   
 
Education: Some college  -.067  -.065  .628*  .616*  .636**  .733**   
  (.368)  (.405)  (.294) (.308)  (.246) (.261)   
 
Education: Less than high  -.407  -.467  .164  .102  .335  .225   
school (.376)  (.415)  (.356  (.367)  (.319)  (.338)   
 
Income  (logged)  -.198  .016  -.219  -.021 .049  .142   
  (.175)  (.203)  (.163) (.177)  (.147) (.165)   
 
Gender:  Female  .406  .476  .096 .110  .070 .081   
  (.252)  (.275)  (.196) (.206)  (.174) (.188)   
 
Age -.001  -.004  -.005  -.000  -.002  .007   
 (.008)  (.009)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  .006)   
 
Residence:  South  .273  .453  -.316 -.267  -.213 -.153     
  (.347)  (.382)  (.288) (.302)  (.256) (.274)   
 
Residence:  West  -.090  .129  -.083 .070  .196 .272   
  (.393)  (.423)  (.299) (.315)  (.258) (.276)   
 
Residence:  Midwest  -.427  -.423  .136 .039  -.059 .046     
  (.371)  (.405)  (.280) (.295)  (.264) (.283) 
 
Strong Republican  -.260  .157  -.204  -.081  -.950*  -.376   
  (.397)  (.431)  (.315) (.334)  (.409) (.434)   
 
Religion: Evangelical  -.585  -.432  -.494  -.414  -.667**  -.468   
  (.344)  (.378)  (.265) (.278)  (.251) (.265)     
 
Religion: Catholic  .060  .015  -.550*  -.596*  -.372  -.354 
  (.299)  (.325)  (.267) (.279)  (.219) (.235) 
 
Favors more active government    .419***    .305***    .356***   
    (.054)   (.042)  (.039)    
 
Intercept -.088  2.150  .060  -7.901  2.453  -10.605   
N 579  576  992  979  1105  1095   
-2 log likelihood  457.451 378.590  726.466  657.724  906.217  793.012 
 
*   p<.05     **p<.01     ***p<.001            
Table 3: Predictors of Arts Participation and Support for Government Activism: 
Americans and the Arts 1975, New Jersey State Poll 1989, Kentucky State Poll 1989, and General Social Survey 1993 
        
              Americans/Arts 1975              GSS 1993           New Jersey 1989       Kentucky 1989 
            Participation    Activism
1    Participation    Activism
1         Participation   Activism
2 Participation       Activism
2 
 
Race: Black        .006  2.928***  -.059*  1.423***  .045  .814  .081  .370                                    
 (.024)  (.489)  (.028)  (.196)  (.036) (.562)  (.055) (.268) 
Race: Other nonwhite  -.056  -.715 -.004  .503 -.007  .812 .105  .373 
 (.037)  (.736)  (.039)  (.288)  (.040) (.636)  (.161) (.788) 
Education: < high school  -.023  .514 -.060*  .029 .009  .594 -.092*  -.119 
 (.019)  (.371)  (.025)  (.184)  (.029) (.458)  (.037) (.183) 
Education: Some college  .149***  .119 .120***  .214 .143***  -.682 .118**  -.138 
 (.020)  (.402)  (.023)  (.161)  (.031) (.488)  (.042) (.204) 
Education: College graduate  .294***  -.460 .299***  -.218 .277***  -.963 .302***  -.452* 
 (.022)  (.440)  (.023)  (.165)  (.031) (.497)  (.043) (.209) 
Income (natural logarithm)  .055***  -.580**  .049***  -.183 .069***  -.008 .057**  -.014 
 (.010)  (.190)  (.013)  (.100)  (.018) (.287)  (.020) (.097) 
Gender: Female   .044**  .274  .064*** .438***  .060**  -.323  .000  -.137 
 (.014)  (.283)  (.017)  (.121)  (.022) (.346)  (.029) (.142) 
Age -.002***  -.053***  -.000  -.028*** .000  .004  -.004***  -.010* 
 (.000)  (.009)  (.000)  (.004)  (.001) (.011)  (.000) (.004) 
Residence: South  -.031  -.070  -.027  -.578**   
 (.021)  (.425)  (.025)  (.176) 
Residence: West  .050*  -.065  .014  -.091 
 (.022)  (.447)  (.026)  (.188)   
Residence: Midwest  .041*  -.550  -.058*  -.334     
 (.019)  (.388)  (.026)  (.183) 
Party Affiliation: Republican .001  -.787*  .039  -1.386*** 
 (.001)  (.367)  (.026)  (.188) 
Religion: Protestant  -.049**  .011 
 (.016)  (.326) 
Religion: Active Evangelical     -.035  -.386**   
     (.020)  (.150) 
Religion: Catholic      .027  -.032   
     (.022)  (.154) 
 
Intercept  -.267 33.652  -.285  17.636  -.521 31.433  -.015 16.198  
Degrees of Freedom  1472  1454  1460  1157  677  675  635  628 
R  Squared  (adjusted)  .250  .076 .213  .196 .169  .012 .202  .011 
 
1Federal government activism 
2State government activism    *p<.05        **p<.01    ***p<.001  
Table 4:  Predictors of Support for Greater Arts Spending 
        
                                                  Americans/Arts 1975                          New Jersey 1989                             Kentucky 1989 
                                               (more federal spending)                     more state spending)                  (more state spending) 
Race:  Black  .544**  .197 .200  .736**  .710*  .677*  .589 .533 .469 
  (.191)  (.199) (.201)  (.269) (.290) (.294)  (.319) (.323) (.325) 
 
Race:  Other  -.350  -.397 -.319  -.169 -.232 -.210  .807 .758 .677 
    (.298)  (.318) (.320)  (.313) (.325) (.328)  (.941) (.971) (.970) 
 
Education:    1.062***  1.251***  .905***  .590* .791**  .473  .542* .629* .414       
BA  or  greater  (.172)  (.185) (.196)  (.235) (.249) (.264)  (.246) (.251) (.262) 
 
Education:    .488**  .540**  .345*  -.018 .090 -.080  .417 .484*  .407 
Some  college  (.256)  (.165) (.170)  (.241) (.251) (.258)  (.240) (.244) (.247) 
 
Education:  Less  -.099  -.175 -.148  .064 -.036 -.069  -.140 -.159 -.086 
than  high  school  (.150)  (.158) (.160)  (.222) (.236) (.240)  (.223) (.227) (.230) 
 
Income  (logged)  .054  .148 .073  -.177 -.193 -.281  -.116 -.122 -.164 
  (.076)  (.081) (.083)  (.138) (.148) (.151)  (.116) (.118) (.120) 
 
Gender:  Female  .455***  .480***  .436***  -.121 -.197 -.197  .117 .117 .118 
  (.113)  (.120) (.121)  (.175) (.179) (.179)  (.170) (.174) (.175) 
 
Age  -.014***  -.009*  -.007  -.004 -.004 -.004  -.015**  -.013*  -.011 
  (.004)  (.004) (.004)  (.006) (.006) (.006)  (.005) (.005) (.006) 
 
Residence: -.061  -.069  -.029 
South (.168)  (.177)  (.179) 
 
Residence: .002  .010  -.051 
West (.176)  (.186)  (.189) 
 
Residence: -.241  -.191  -.253 
Midwest (.254)  (.163)  (.166) 
 
Strong  -.125  -.041 -.060  -.149 -.015 .058  .106 .172 .135 
Republican  (.147)  (.145) (.160)  (.192) (.201) (.204)  (.194) (.198) (.200) 
 
Religion:  -.304*  -.345*  -.286*  -.103 -.099 -.081  .068 .039 .036 
Protestant  (.129)  (.136) (.139)  (.194) (.202) (.205)  (.200) (.203) (.204) 
 
Favors  more      .142*** .142***    .163*** .163***    .199*** .197*** 
active  government    (.013) (.013)    (.022) (.023)    (.051) (.052) 
 
Arts  participation      1.311***     1.139***    .739** 
     (.219)    (.310)     (.237) 
 
Intercept  -.623  -5.515 -5.136  1.213 -3.843 -3.186  1.084 -2.032 -1.980 
N  1469  1465  1465  687 685 685  634 628 628 
-2  log  likelihood  1845.509  1691.7921655.052  851.115 787.016 773.312  823.555  800.854 791.092
           
* p<.05     **p<.01     ***p<.001  
Table 5.  Logistic Regression of Support for “Much Less” Federal Arts Spending 
        
                                                          GSS --- 1985       GSS---1990                                 GSS---1996              
 
Race:  Black  -1.097  -1.241  -1.118  -.515 -.233 -.206  -.526 -.206 .278 
  (.623) (.640) (.672)  (.327) (.338) (.342)  (.281) (.293) (.306) 
 
Race:  Other  -5.497 -5.445 -5.150  -.276  -.345  -.261  -.169  .031  .109 
    (10.307)  (10.233)  (9.997)  (.428) (.430) (.434)  (.382) (.386) (.398) 
 
Education:      -1.016**  -1.100**  -1.284**  -.745** -.643** -.637**  -.648** -.596** -.886*** 
BA  or  greater  (.378) (.387) (.403)  (.240) (.526) (.246)  (.210) (.219) (.233) 
 
Education:    -.228 -.204 -.273  -.870***  -.793**  -.786**  -.497*  -.529*  -.551* 
Some  college  (.330) (.335) (.345)  (.245) (.27)  (.249)  (.209) (.214) (.220) 
 
Education:  Less  .146 .174 -.304  .193 .192 .198  -.092 -.213 -.130 
than  high  school  (.322) (.325) (.355)  (.228) (.231) (.234)  (.251) (.258) (.266) 
 
Income  (logged)  .422 .413 .252  .034 .004 -.060  .325 .284 .267 
  (.220) (.220) (.220)  1.035 1.004  .942  1.384 1.328 1.306 
 
Gender:  Female  -.449 -.468 -.465  -.044 -.047 -.031  -.379*  -.404*  -.365* 
  (.268) (.269) (.277)  (.172) (.173) (.175)  (.161) (.165) (.170) 
 
Age  .003 .003 -.002  -.011*  -.011*  -.011*  .009 .009 .004 
  (.008) (.008) (.008)  (.005) (.005) (.005)  (.005) (.005) (.005) 
 
Residence:  .607 .612 .477  .286 .264 .289  .658**  .436 .446 
South  (.366) (.385) (.395)  (.241) (.260) (.265)  (.247) (.259) (.267) 
 
Residence:  .141 .081 -.120  .141 .213 .207  .460 .358 .399 
West  (.429) (.438) (.458)  (.278) (.288) (.293)  (.258) (.274) (.283) 
 
Residence:  .090 .084 -.070  -.317 -.314 -.321  .377 .266 .256 
Midwest  (.389) (.392) (.402)  (.267) (.273) (.276)  (.264) (.272) (.280) 
 
Strong   .229  .030  .236  .273  .983***  .578* 
Republican   (.344)  (.358)  (.261)  (.266)  (.230)  (.247) 
 
Religion:  -.256  -.308  .621**  .579**   .701***  .571**   
Evangelical   (.298)  (.307)  (.213)  (.217)  (.198)  (.204) 
 
Religion:       -.350  -.375    .633**  .638**    .117  .094 
Catholic   (.314)  (.323)  (.226)  (.229)  (.216)  (.222) 
 
Favors  more  active    -.208**    -.085**    -.187*** 
government  (scale)     (.044)     (.033)     (.029) 
 
Intercept  -5.789 -5.513  -.107  -1.064 -1.213  .928  -4.956 -4.825 -1.110   
N  579 579 576  992 992 979  1105  1105  1095 
-2  log  likelihood  463.320  461.424 436.970  891.485 878.475 860.711  1015.477 981.263 930.707 
Notes:  * p<.05     **p<.01     ***p<.001  
 
 















Question & Coding 
Americans and the 
Arts 
1975  U.S. Population > 16  1555  Spending Questions 
In the next few years do you feel that federal spending on (The arts) 
should be increased, should it be decreased or stay about the same?   
MOREFED = 1 if respondent answered “increased”, else = 0. 
LESSFED = 1 if respondent answered “decreased”, else = 0. 
Arts Participation Measures 
Approximately how many times did you go to live theatre 
performances in the past 12 months, not counting any performances 
given by your children in connection with school or classes?  Also 
asked about classical music or opera, and live performances of ballet, 
modern, folk or ethnic dance.  If respondent indicated between once 
and more than 10 times, measure = 1, else = 0.   
ARTPART averaged 3 measures. 
Government Activism Measures 
In the next few years do you feel that federal spending on (Housing 
and community development) should be increased, should it be 
decreased or stay about the same?  Also asked about welfare, public 
transportation, health, highways, education and manpower training, 
and farm income stabilization.  Measures were reverse coded so 
1=decreased, 3=stay about the same or not sure, and 5=increased.   
GOVACT is the sum of the seven measures.   
 
Americans and the 
Arts 
1980  U.S. Population > 16  1501  Spending Questions 
If arts organizations – such as art museums, dance, opera, and theater 
groups, and symphony orchestras – need financial assistance to 
operate, do you feel that (The federal government) should provide  
assistance, or not?  Also asked about state government and municipal 
and county government.   
FED = 1 if respondent answered “should provide” to federal question, 
else=0. 
NOFED = 1 if respondent answered “should not provide” to federal 
question, else=0. 
Same recodes for STAT, NOSTAT, LOCAL, NOLOCAL. 
Arts Participation Measures 
Approximately how many times did you go to live theater 
performances in the past 12 months, not counting any performances 
given by your children in connection with school or classes?  Also 
asked about classical music or opera, opera or musical theater, ballet, 
modern, folk or ethnic dance, and art museums.  If respondent 
indicated between once and more than 20 times, measure=1, else=0. 
ARTPART averaged 5 measures. 
 
Americans and the 
Arts 
1987  U.S. Population    1501  Spending Measures 
If arts organizations—such as art museums, dance, opera, and theater 
groups, and symphony orchestras—need financial assistance to operate, 
do you feel that (The federal government) should provide assistance, 
or not?  Also asked about state government. 
FED = 1 if respondent answered “should provide” to federal question, 
else=0. 
NOFED = 1 if respondent answered “should not provide” to federal 
question, else=0. 
Same recodes for STAT. 
Arts Participation Measures 
Approximately how many times did you go to live theater 
performances in the past 12 months, not counting any performances 
given by your children in connection with school or classes?  Also 
asked about classical music, opera or musical theater, ballet, modern, 
folk or ethnic dance, and art museums.  If respondent indicated  
between once and more than 20 times, measure=1, else=0. 
ARTPART averaged 5 measures. 
 
Americans and the 
Arts 
1992  U.S. Population    1005  Spending Measures 
If arts organizations—such as art museums, dance, opera, and theater 
groups, and symphony orchestras—need financial assistance to operate, 
do you feel that (The federal government) should provide assistance, 
or not?  Also asked about state government. 
FED = 1 if respondent answered “should provide” to federal question, 
else=0. 
NOFED = 1 if respondent answered “should not provide” to federal 
question, else=0. 
Same recodes for STAT. 
Arts Participation Measures 
Approximately how many times did you go to live theater 
performances in the past 12 months, not counting any performances 
given by your children in connection with school or classes?  Also 
asked about classical music, opera or musical theater, ballet, modern, 
folk, ethnic or jazz dance, and art museums or art galleries.  If 
respondent indicated between once and more than 20 times, 
measure=1, else=0. 
ARTPART averaged 5 measures. 
 
General Social Survey  1985  U.S. Population    677  Spending Measures 
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate 
whether you would like to see more or less government spending in 
each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a 
tax increase to pay for it.  Asked about “Culture and the arts.” 
MOREFED=1 if respondent answered “more” or “much more” 
spending, else=0. 
LESSFED=1 if respondent answered “much less” spending, else=0. 
Government Activism Measures  
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate 
whether you would like to see more or less government spending in 
each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a 
tax increase to pay for it.  Asked about the environment, health, 
education, retirement benefits, and unemployment benefits.  
Responses reverse coded so that 5=much more, 3=stay the same, 
1=much less. 
GOVACT is the sum of the 5 measures. 
 
General Social Survey  1990  U.S. Population    1217  Arts Participation Measures 
Next I'd like to ask about some leisure or recreational activities that 
people do during their free time. As I read each activity, can you tell 
me if it is something you have done in the past twelve months? (Visit 
an art museum or gallery).  Did you do that within the past twelve 
months?  Also asked about classical music or opera performance.  If 
respondent indicated yes, then measure=1, else=0. 
ARTPART is the average of the two measures. 
Government Activism Measures 
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can 
be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these 
problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think 
we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the 
right amount. Are we spending too much money, too little money, or 
about the right amount on (Improving the conditions of Blacks).  Also 
asked about health, welfare, the environment, mass transit, education, 
and social security.  Responses reverse coded so that 5=spending too 
little, 3=about the right amount, 1=spending too much.   
GOVACT is the sum of the 6 measures. 
 
General Social Survey  1993  U.S. Population    1606  Spending Measures 
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate 
whether you would like to see more or less government spending in  
each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a 
tax increase to pay for it.  Asked about “Culture and the arts.” 
MOREFED=1 if respondent answered “more” or “much more” 
spending, else=0. 
LESSFED=1 if respondent answered “much less” spending, else=0. 
Government Activism Measures 
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate 
whether you would like to see more or less government spending in 
each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a 
tax increase to pay for it.  Asked about the environment, health, 
education, retirement benefits, and unemployment benefits.  
Responses reverse coded so that 5=much more, 3=stay the same, 
1=much less. 
GOVACT is the sum of the 5 measures. 
 
General Social Survey  1996  U.S. Population    1332  Spending Measures 
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate 
whether you would like to see more or less government spending in 
each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a 
tax increase to pay for it.  Asked about “Culture and the arts.” 
MOREFED=1 if respondent answered “more” or “much more” 
spending, else=0. 
LESSFED=1 if respondent answered “much less” spending, else=0. 
Government Activism Measures 
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate 
whether you would like to see more or less government spending in 
each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a 
tax increase to pay for it.  Asked about the environment, health, 
education, retirement benefits, and unemployment benefits.  
Responses reverse coded so that 5=much more, 3=stay the same, 
1=much less. 
GOVACT is the sum of the 5 measures.  
 
Kentucky Poll  1989  Kentucky Residents  705  Spending Measures 
Would you like to see Kentucky state government spend more, less, or 
about the same to support arts in Kentucky? 
MORESTAT=1 if respondent answered more, else=0. 
LESSSTAT=1 if respondent answered less, else=0. 
Arts Participation Measures 
About how often do you attend live theater?  Would you say you 
attend once a month or more often, about every two months, about 
every three to six months, once or twice a year, less often than once a 
year, or never?  Also asked about art exhibits or museums.  If 
respondent indicated at least once a year then measure=1, else=0.   
ARTPART is the average of the two measures. 
Government Activism Measures 
Please tell me whether you think state and local government here in 
Kentucky should be spending more, less, or about the same as now 
amount of tax dollars on (environmental programs)(sic)?  Also asked 
about programs for the poor, education, streets and highways, state 
colleges and universities, and health care hospitals.  Responses reverse 
coded so that 3=more, 2=same, 1=less. 
GOVACT is the sum of the 6 measures. 
 
New Jersey Poll  1989  New Jersey Residents  798  Spending Measures 
As you know, most of the money government spends comes from the 
taxes you and others pay.  For each of the following, please tell me 
whether you think state and local government here in New Jersey 
should be spending more, less, or about the same as now.  How about 
(cultural programs and the arts)—should more, less, or the same be 
spent? 
MORESTAT=1 if respondent answered more, else=0. 
LESSSTAT=1 if respondent answered less, else=0. 
Arts Participation Measures  
About how many times if any have you been to (a performance of 
classical music, such as the opera or symphony) in the last 12 months?  
Also asked about live theater, the ballet, or some other dance 
performance, and an art gallery, exhibit or museums. If respondent 
indicated at least once then measure=1, else=0. 
ARTPART is the average of the 4 measures. 
Government Activism Measures 
As you know, most of the money government spends comes from the 
taxes you and others pay.  For each of the following, please tell me 
whether you think state and local government here in New Jersey 
should be spending more, less, or about the same as now.  How about 
(environmental programs)—should more, less, or the same be spent?  
Also asked about programs for the poor, streets and highways, public 
transportation, programs for the elderly, tourism, toxic waste cleanup, 
and direct state aid to cities and towns.  Responses reverse coded so 
that 3=more, 2=same, 1=less. 
GOVACT is the sum of the 8 measures. 
Note:  Only half of GSS respondents were asked questions about arts funding in 1985.  
Appendix Table 2: 
Attitudes towards Government Spending on Culture and the Arts 
by Selected Groups: GSS 1985, 1990, 1996 
 
                                         Favors More Spending                    Favors Much Less Spending 
  1985 1990 1996 1985 1990 1996 
Education    
BA  or  more  24.2 26.4 22.5  10.6 11.5 15.4 
1-3  years  college  12.1 14.3 15.9  16.1 11.7 16.5 
High  school  graduate  13.9 7.3 9.5  18.9  22.6  22.2 
Less than high school 12.1  8.3  15.5  18.5  25.5  18.0 
N  614 1072 1234  614 1072 1234   
  
Religion 
Evangelical  10.2 8.6 8.5  18.8  25.5  28.2 
Catholic  15.0  9.3 12.8  13.8 21.8 15.5 
N  614 1074 1238  614 1074 1238 
 
Women  18.9 14.3 15.9  12.7 16.9 15.6   
N  614 1074 1238  614 1074 1238 
 
Region  
East  19.8 15.0 16.5  13.5 16.3 11.8 
South  17.5 11.3 13.8  19.9 22.5 21.5 
N  614 1074 1238  614 1074 1238 
 
Party 
Strong  Republican  12.0 13.5  7.1  16.0 21.4 37.3   
Strong  Democrat 26.6 24.2 24.9  11.7 12.1 13.3 
N  612 1072 1236  612 1072 1236 
 
 
 